Fortunately, important insights into this demographic challenge have emerged in the past 10 years. Most important is that the rate of population growth is not the only demographic variable with consequences for economic growth and development: the age structure of the population is also fundamentally important.
the deMoGraPhic traNSitioN
PoPulatioN Growth has taken place as part of a broader phenomenon known as the demographic transition-the transition that almost all countries make from high fertility and mortality to low fertility and mortality. Not counting net migration (which has been inconsequential for most countries), populations grow because death rates tend to decline before birth rates. But there is more to this story: death rates decline disproportionately among infants and children, which gives rise to a baby boom. This is not the usual kind of baby boom in which more babies are born; rather, it is one in which more babies survive and mature into children and adults. Eventually the baby boom ends when parents realize that they do not need to have as many children to reach their goals for family size, which naturally moderate as development proceeds.
the deMoGraPhic diVideNd at firSt, the baby boom tends to lower the measured rate of economic growth because children need to be fed, clothed, housed, educated, and otherwise cared for-all of which require resources that must be diverted from other uses such as research and development (R&D), infrastructure development, and physical capital accumulation. But eventually (after 15 to 20 years) the large "boom" cohorts reach the prime ages for working and saving, and the per capita productive capacity of the economy expands. When this happens, the country has an opportunity to grow rapidly-resulting in what we call the "demographic dividend."
The demographic dividend is a composite of accounting and behavioral forces. 
SPecial rePortS
the fact that the working ages coin-■ cide with the prime years for savings. These factors are key to the accumulation of physical and human capital and technological innovation.
The behavioral forces consist of: society's reallocation of resources ■ from investing in children to investing in physical capital, job training, technological progress, and stronger institutions, the rise in women's participation in ■ the workforce that naturally comes with a decline in fertility, and the boost to savings that occurs be-■ cause the incentive to save for longer periods of retirement increases as people live longer. Recent analyses have shown that population growth and age structure are important drivers of economic growth (measured by income per capita). Indeed, as much as one-third of East Asia's economic "miracle" was due to demographic change. Similarly, the 1980 legalization of birth control in Ireland sparked a decrease in fertility that spurred rapid economic growth. By contrast, the sluggish pace of fertility decline in most of Sub-Saharan Africa contributed to that region's decadeslong economic struggle.
the aGe coMPoSitioN what doeS thiS MeaN for development policy making? Since different countries are at different phases in the demographic cycle, the age distribution of their populations varies. As the demographic transition proceeds and the baby boom cohort reaches working age in a given country, the ratio of workingfigure 2 shows where the ratio is still rising-in all developing regions other than eastern asia. these areas could still benefit significantly from a demographic dividend. But collecting this dividend is not automatic. demography is not destiny. data source: uN, world Population Prospects: the 2008 revision. fiGure 1: reGioNS aBout to eNter the deMoGraPhic dowNSwiNG where a country stands in the transition will determine the kinds of policies and initiatives it can most usefully undertake to help bring about a demographic dividend. for example, some countries could catalyze the demographic transition by taking steps to lower infant and child mortality-crucial precursors of fertility decline-through the expansion of childhood immunization and the provision of safe water and sanitation. others might encourage a voluntary reduction of fertility, perhaps through efforts to broaden access to primary and reproductive health services, and to girls' education. data source: uN, world Population Prospects: the 2008 revision. Figures  1 and 2 show how this ratio has changed and is projected to change across the world. Using the UN Population Division's medium-fertility scenario, Figure  1shows that the ratio is about to fall in Eastern Asia and the more developed regions, which means that the opportunity to reap a demographic dividend has already reached its peak. Where a country stands in the transition will determine the kinds of policies and initiatives it can most usefully undertake to help bring about a demographic dividend. For example, some countries could catalyze the demographic transition by taking steps to lower infant and child mortality-crucial precursors of fertility decline-through the expansion of childhood immunization and the provision of safe water and sanitation. Others might encourage a voluntary reduction of fertility, perhaps through efforts to broaden access to primary and reproductive health services, and to girls' education.
differences in fertility, infant and child mortality rates, and life expectancy have combined to give china and india very different ratios of working-age population to dependent population (figure 4). Beginning around 1980, china's ratio rose very rapidly and has now reached its peak, with nearly 2.6 working-age people per dependent. india's peak, which is likely to be lower than china's, is projected to occur around 2035. these patterns suggest that china has already had its opportunity to capture a demographic dividend, while much of india's opportunity lies ahead. to the extent that india can speed up fertility decline, especially in states where fertility is still high, it stands to reap a more sizable dividend in the coming years. Good governance matters, as do solid macroeconomic management, a carefully designed trade policy, efficient infrastructure, well-functioning financial and labor markets, and above all, effective investments in health, education, and training.
healthy aNd educated PeoPle
Better health MeaNS that students learn more quickly, workers produce more effectively, foreign investors are more likely to be attracted, and savings rise. Expanded access to better quality education-at the primary, secondary, and tertiary levels-are also key to high worker productivity, especially in the rising number of jobs that demand upto-date skills and a high degree of flexibility. Increased education also tends to lead to lower fertility rates, which frees up women to engage in the paid labor force. In the absence of enabling policies, a potential demographic dividend can become, instead, a demographic drag. For example, a country that has large numbers of young or middle-age workers who are unemployed or underemployed is at risk of social and political instability. And even without such instability, a large nonproductive segment of the population is an economic drag on those who are working. iNdia aNd chiNadiVerGeNt Policy SceNarioS coMPariNG iNdia with chiNa highlights the effect of differing past policies and the need for specific policies that fit with a country's progress through the demographic cycle. China's emphasis beginning in the 1970s on lowering its birthrate has resulted in a total fertility rate of 1.8 children per woman-and a rapidly aging population that will need care and support. India's efforts to slow population growth were, most of the time, less intrusive, but they also led to a less precipitous decline in fertility (2.7 today). Figure 3 illustrates the dramatic difference between the two countries in the pace of fertility decline. The biggest unanswered question is that of population aging, which is occurring in both developed and developing countries. Although many have warned that an older population spells economic doom, other analysts suggest that it is not an insurmountable problem provided it is well managed. Although the private sector can help by adjusting business practices to adapt to an older workforce, it is mainly up to public policy makers to take strategic and politically feasible decisions on retirement age, immigration policy, and related issues.
Policy MaKerS oN the deMoGraPhic diVideNd
Creating an economic environment in which the working-age population is productively employed is a difficult though essential goal in itself. But changing demographics provides an extra spur for adopting the kinds of economic, health, education, and labor policies that can lead to more rapid economic growth.
David E. Bloom is Professor of Economics and Demography and David Canning is Professor of Economics and International
Health at the Harvard School of Public Health.
Bibliography

